We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two items is known, and the agent knows the valuation for the current item (but not for the one in the future). The designer seeks to maximize expected revenue, and the auction must be deterministic, truthful, and ex post individually rational. The optimum mechanism involves a protocol whereby the seller elicits the buyer's current valuation, and based on the bid makes two take-it-or-leave-it offers, one for now and one for the future. We show that finding the optimum mechanism -arguably the simplest meaningful dynamic mechanism design problem imaginable -is NP-hard. We also prove several positive results, among them a polynomial linear programming-based algorithm for the optimum randomized auction, and we show strong separations in revenue between non-adaptive, adaptive, and randomized auctions.
Introduction
Imagine that the wireless company wants to sell you two phones, one now and one in three years. You know precisely how much the phone is worth to you now, but for three years hence you only have a prior. The company knows the joint distribution (for which your prior is the conditional). How should the company design the sale process to maximize revenue?
With no phone in the future, this is well understood -and in fact, a trivial case of Myerson's theorem [12] : The company makes an offer easily calculated from your prior. But the second phone makes things much more complicated. We have a dynamic mechanism design problem.
Dynamic mechanisms are everywhere. We participate in the same mechanism again and again, and our experiences (during past participations or in between) influence our current behavior. The adword auction for "car accident" is very fundamentally a dynamic mechanism -even though, to our knowledge, it has never been treated as one. When you think of it this way, most of mechanism design seems almost a cop out from the true, dynamic nature of the real problem.
There has been some fine work on dynamic mechanisms (see [2] for a survey ca. 2010), and the literature is growing fast; some of it is squarely from the algorithmic point of view. Common models involve dynamic arrivals and departures of agents, e.g. [15, 13, 8, 9] , or agents whose private information evolves [6, 11, 17, 5, 4, 3, 1, 7] . Notice, incidentally, that our model involves neither of these two dynamic features: it is dynamic in a very minimal way, simply because the information about fixed types is obtained over time. Techniques and concepts from static mechanism design such as VCG almost never carry over intact to dynamic mechanisms, and even the revelation principle is in doubt. Novel techniques such as a "dynamic pivot" mechanism are developed, while budget balance can occasionally be guaranteed and even revenue equivalence holds under conditions [16] . Incentive compatibility and tractability via learning algorithms is possible in some specialized models [10] . But, overall, we believe it is fair to say that we have not seen Myerson's theorem in dynamic mechanism design: an elegant, powerful characterization of pristine clarity and ample generality.
The question is by now mature: Is there a Myerson's theorem in dynamic mechanism design? What would it look like? And -this brings us to our interest here -if there isn't, how do you prove it? Our group's past work may be informative in this regard, because a couple of years ago we showed a result implying that there is no Myerson's theorem in single item auctions with correlated bidders: the problem is NP-hard for three or more bidders [14] .
Our main result is that the two-phone problem is strongly NP-hard. More specifically, it is NPcomplete, given a prior with finite support, to find the optimum deterministic 1 , truthful, ex post individually rational mechanism. (We require ex post truthfulness for the same reason we insist on determinism: we believe that they are the boundary of realistic mechanisms in which people are likely to choose to participate). Since we cannot think of a simpler dynamic mechanism design problem, we propose that there is no grand sweeping positive result lurking somewhere in the realm of dynamic mechanism design.
We first characterize the mechanisms of interest (Section 2). It turns out that there is always an optimum deterministic mechanism that is semi-adaptive (Lemma 1). A non-adaptive mechanism 1 We insist on deterministic mechanisms (which a reviewer once called "an unimportant special case"...) for good reason. Randomized mechanisms are a wonderful conceptual device well worth a researcher's time, and in fact we prove some very strong positive results about them in this paper. But they are not real mechanisms. Myerson introduces them and plunges bravely in their analysis, only to emerge triumphant, his deterministic optimal auction in hand. If his optimal mechanism were randomized, we suspect that the Swedish Academy may not have been as kind -assuming that MOR had accepted the paper. eBay is solvent exactly because it avoids randomized auctions. We could go on and on. Life is, of course, full of uncertainties, and we deal with them as best as we can -which is not very well [18] ; this is precisely the reason why we long for determinism in what we design. Gambling does happen, of course, because for all these reasons it makes good evolutionary sense for us to engage in randomized play. But this is getting too long and philosophical... is one that makes two independent offers, one now and one in the future, without eliciting any input from the buyer; we show in Section 5 that it does very poorly. In contrast, a semi-adaptive mechanism starts by eliciting the buyer's type (and takes care that she is truthful), and then makes two offers simultaneously, one for now and one for the future. The buyer can take or leave the first offer now, and come back in three years to take or leave the second offer (which she knows now). Incidentally, it is quite unusual in mechanism design that a price is based crucially on a bid, but in our optimal mechanism it does. So, all we have to do is, design a function, informed by the whole joint distribution, that maps the support of the buyer's current distribution to two prices. It is not so easy...
One reason is that truthfulness is quite subtle in this context, and incentive compatibility constraints are a big part of the problem's difficulty. You give the buyer enough incentives (both right now and in future expectation) so she will not misrepresent her type. This is done by choosing price pairs such that, for any other current valuation, the buyer is best off, in expectation, telling the truth. Low prices now must be counterbalanced carefully with higher prices in the future, and the inequalities involve integrals of the cumulative conditional distributions of the future valuation.
In Section 3 we describe our NP-completeness proof. It is rather elaborate. It is from Independent Set (after many simplifications of the original constraint satisfaction problem). The types (support points of the current distribution) are the nodes. For each current valuation, two of the possible current prices stand out as potentially optimal, and choosing between them is tantamount to deciding whether a node will be in the maximum independent set. The optimum revenue achieved is a strictly increasing function of the independent set size. The truthfulness constraints enforce that no two adjacent nodes are included, and this necessitates a very elaborate design of the conditional distributions associated with the nodes.
In Section 4 we show that the problem of finding the optimum randomized mechanism can be done in polynomial time, and in fact for any finite number of periods of sale and for any finite number of buyers. We first reduce the randomized auction to a simple form (basically, all prices are on the support), and then we write a linear program for the optimum mechanism; several reasons why this LP should be exponential must be overcome. Incidentally, we have a few more positive results, which we mention in the conclusion of Section 4, because they also involve linear programming: If the support of the distribution of the first-day valuation is finite, then the problem again becomes easy, also through linear programming. We conjecture that the same is true if the second-day conditional has finite support, or if the distribution is affiliated. If we are given the first-round prices and we want to optimize the second-round prices, this can be approximated by an FPTAS, based on an integer program that happens to be totally unimodular (the precise approach we advise our students to never take happens to work here...). The other way (fixing future prices) is also true. These two last results point to the source of one major difficulty in proving NP-completeness of the problem: The prices of both items must vary over types...
Finally, in Section 5 we show strong (non-constant) separation results between these quantities: (1) The optimum social welfare of the transaction; (2) the optimum revenue by a randomized mechanism; (3) the optimum revenue by a deterministic mechanism; (4) the optimum revenue by a non-adaptive mechanism (two blind offers). As a side product of the separation between (1) and (2), we show something that must have been observed before: the maximum separation between the optimum revenue and the optimum social welfare in a single-item Bayesian auction is precisely the harmonic number of the largest valuation (the other separations are also polynomial functions of the logarithm of the largest valuation).
The Auction
The Two-day Auction problem involves one bidder and two items auctioned in two periods called "days." The bidder can be in one of n types. The ith type has probability p i , valuation v 1 i for the first item, and probability distribution f i over valuations for the second item. Our goal is to design an auction that maximizes the designer's revenue, subject to incentive compatibility (IC) and ex post individual rationality (IR). We shall develop the math behind these constraints soon, but for now we'll treat them informally.
What can we say about the structure of revenue-optimal dynamic auctions? The point of this paper is that they are in fact quite complex. Nonetheless we can significantly restrict our search space. Call a mechanism semi-adaptive if it depends on the buyer's declared type. In such a mechanism the buyer submits a bid for the first day, and the seller, based on it, produces a price p for the first day and a price q for the second (a price can be infinity, in which case the seller does not offer this item).
Semi-adaptive auctions are optimal
Rather surprisingly, this seemingly weak protocol is optimal. Lemma 1. There is a revenue-optimal mechanism which is semi-adaptive.
Proof. Suppose that in a deterministic revenue-optimal auction satisfying incentive compatibility and ex-post individual rationality, the price on the second day q(v 1 , v 2 ) depends on the buyer's valuations on both days, v 1 and v 2 . Fix any first-day valuation v 1 = w, and let u * = arg min u≥q(w,u) q(w, u) be the second-day valuation which minimizes that second day price, among all second-day valuations for which the item is allocated.
• v 2 > q(w, u * ): the buyer could declare valuation u * in order to buy the item for the minimum price. Therefore, since the auction is incentive compatible, it must charge q(w, v 2 ) = q(w, u * ).
• v 2 < q(w, u * ): we can assume wlog that the price is again q(w, u * ), since the buyer would not buy the item anyway for the current price q(w, v 2 )(≥ q(w, u * )).
• v 2 = q(w, u * ): the buyer's utility remains zero for any price q(w, v 2 ) ≥ q(w, u * ); however, the auctioneer's revenue is clearly maximized when selling the item for price q(w, v 2 ) = q(w, u * )
Finally, any buyer with a different first-day valuation v 1 = w ′ that attempts to deviate and declare valuation w on the first day, would wlog also deviate her second-day valuation to u * .
Note that it is not clear whether the same is true for randomized auctions, because we do not have an order over distributions of prices: one distribution may be more attractive to one type, while another distribution is more attractive for another type.
Incentive compatibility constraints
Once we restrict ourselves to semi-adaptive auctions, the auction becomes two functions p, q mapping the support of the prior to the reals. Let p(v) be the price charged for the first day item, and q(v) the price charged for the second day item, when the bidder reports valuation v. Let u(v, v ′ ) be the expected utility of the bidder when her true value in day one is v and she declares v ′ . This utility is the utility of the first day plus the expected utility for the second day, when offered a take-it-or-leave-it price q(v ′ ). We want
A nice, compact form to express our IC constraints is using the cumulative distribution of the second day:
The observation here is that the buyer's second day utility for valuation v, when charged price q in day 2, is ∞ q F v (x)dx. So, for any two possible first-day valuations v and v ′ , the IC constraints are:
• If both v and v ′ receive the item on the first day:
• If neither receives the item on the first day:
• If v ′ receives the item on the first day, but v does not:
We will write Rev(t i , p i , q i ) to denote the auctioneer's revenue, when charging type t i the first day price p i and second day price q i . We will write Rev 1 or Rev 2 when we want to refer only to the revenue from the first or second day, respectively.
Deterministic auctions are NP-hard
Theorem 2. Finding the optimal two-day auction is strongly NP-hard.
Outline
Given a graph G = (V, E) be a graph, we construct a joint distribution of valuations such that the optimal feasible revenue (for deterministic IC and IR auctions) is a strictly increasing function of the maximum independent set in G.
More specifically, with each vertex i ∈ G we associate a type t i with valuation v 1 = B i for the first day. For each type t i , we want to have two candidate price pairs:
The former will give more revenue, but for every edge (i, j) ∈ E, it will be a violation of the IC constraints to charge both type t i (B i , C i ) and type t j (B j , C j ). Thus, if the difference r in expected revenue between (B i , C i ) and (A i , D i ) is the same for all i, charging the former for all the vertices of an independent set S and the latter for the rest of the vertices will be a valid pricing, with revenue
In order to impose the (B i , C i ) vs (A i , D i ) structure, we have an extra type t * , with valuation v 1 = P * on the first day. t * appears with very high probability. This way we make most of our revenue from this type, and thus force every revenue-optimal auction to charge this type the optimal prices, (P * , Q * ). The IC constraints for type t * introduce strong restrictions on the prices for other types.
The restriction on each edge (i, j) is forced by the IC constraints for t i and t j , via a careful construction of the distributions over their second-day valuations. The second day distribution of t i will be F i and will change behavior between D j−1 and D j depending on whether or not (i, j) ∈ E. See figure 1.
Figure 1: F i when there is (dotted) and when there isn't (dashed) an (i, j) edge, for j > i
Construction
The distribution of valuations on the first day is rather simple. Let n = |V | denote the number of vertices in G. With probability 1−p, the buyer is of type t * and has first-day valuation v 1 = P * = n; with probability p·w i , the buyer is of type t i and has first-day valuation
. The parameters p and w i will be defined soon. Notice that the first day has support of size n + 1. We will show that it is always possible to charge type i either her full value B i on day 1, or slightly less: A i = B i − ǫ, for ǫ = 1/n 2 . For type t * , we always want to charge the full price, P * . Observe that
For the second day we are interested in pricings C i or D i for t i , and Q * for t * . Although we only have n types, it will be convenient to think about two more special prices, which we denote C n+1 and D n+1 . We will define C i , D i and Q * later; for now let us mention that
Second day valuations
The crux of the reduction lies in describing the distributions of the second-day valuations for each type. It will be convenient to describe the cumulative distributions
The choices of the cumulative distributions in our construction are summarized in Table 1 . Type t i never has nonzero second-day valuation less than C i , thus the cumulative distribution F i (x) for x ∈ (0, C i ) is h i = γ −4i , for γ = 1 + 1/n. Intuitively, this will make C i an attractive price for the auctioneer. Notice that γ n ≈ e is a constant.
At each special price thereafter, F i decreases by some multiplicative factor that is related to γ. The exact value of F i (x) for x ∈ (D j−1 , D j ) depends on whether there is an edge (i, j) in G. 2 After D n+1 , the distribution for all types t i is the same. F i halves at each 2 k D n+1 , and it is 0 after Q * = 2 8γ 4(n+1) D n+1 . We use a similar construction (pow2) in Section 5 to construct distributions which yield low revenue, but high social welfare.
The distribution F * is simpler to describe. F * (x) is h 1 for x ∈ (0, C 1 ), and decreases by a multiplicative factor of γ 2 at each special price thereafter. Type t * never has valuations between D n+1 and Q * = 2 8γ 4(n+1) D n+1 . F * is constant in this domain; in particular
Intuitively, this will make Q * an attractive price for the auctioneer. Notice also the contrast between this and the gradual decrease of F i 's.
Fixing the last parameters
One of the most important parameters in our construction is r i : we later prove that r i is the difference in expected revenue, conditioned on type t i , between pricing at (B i , C i ), and pricing at
We set r n+1 =
= Θ(n); the rest of r i 's are defined recursively:
Notice that
Observe that with the recursive definition of r i (1) we can get a nice expression for the following difference:
The differences between pairs of special prices are summarized in Table 2 . Finally, we want the contribution towards the revenue from each vertex in the independent set to be the same. To that end, we set r = 1/r i = Θ(1), and weight the probability of observing each type t i by w i = r/r i . We set the total probability of observing any of the t i 's to be Recall that the IC constraints depend on the integrals of the cumulative distribution functions. The values of the F i 's and F * in our construction are tailored to make sure that their integrals have the values described in Table 3 . Table 3 Proof. Follows from multiplying the correct combination of entries of Table 1 and Table 2 .
This completes the construction of the instance of Two-day Auction, starting from the instance of Independent Set. Incidentally, notice that the numbers used are polynomial in the size of the input graph. Proofs of completeness and soundness of the construction are postponed to Appendix A.
Randomized auctions
Can we do better by using randomization? As a warm up exercise, we construct an LP that gives a randomized mechanism that performs at least as well -and sometimes much better -than the optimal deterministic mechanism. A randomized semi-adaptive auction takes as input the buyer's declared type on day one, and outputs a distribution over pairs of prices. As we have stated after the proof of Lemma 1, it is not clear that the optimum randomized auction is semi-adaptive. But the optimum semi-adaptive randomized auction has at least as good a revenue as any two-day deterministic auction. A key observation that significantly reduces the search space is the following: when considering randomized auctions, we can assume without loss of generality that every price in the support is exactly equal to a feasible valuation in the support of buyer's types, zero, or infinite.
Lemma 4. Let V d be the set of possible valuations on day d. Then given any semi-adaptive auction A (randomized or deterministic), there exists a randomized semi-adaptive auction A ′ , with at least as good revenue, which on day d only offers prices in V d ∪ {0, ∞}. 
with probability π i +απ and v d i+1 with probability π i+1 + (1 − α)π. Observe that the expected price is the same.
Notice that the probability of allocation of the item on day d can only increase: if the buyer bought the item on day d for price p d , her valuation could only be v d j ≥ v d i+1 , so the probability she buys is unchanged. If she didn't buy with price p d and her valuation was v d i , she will buy with (απ) higher probability in A ′ . When v d j < v d i nothing changes. Since the probability of allocation increases, with the same expected prices, the revenue also increases. On the other hand the buyer's utility remains unchanged between A and A ′ : the expected price is the same, and the extra probability of allocation comes from cases when the buyer pays her valuation. Thus, the IC constraints of A continue to hold in A ′ .
It is easy to see that this proof did not use in any crucial way the semi-adaptive property, so this normalization is possible for all randomized auctions.
We are now ready to describe our LP for two-day semi-adaptive randomized auctions:
Theorem 5. The optimal two-day semi-adaptive randomized auction can be found in time polynomial in the number of types.
Proof. We construct an LP of size O V 1 · V 1 + V 2 that optimizes over all two-day semiadaptive randomized auctions:
• Variables: The variables in our LP will specify the distribution of prices given the valuation on the first day. Notice that because of the restriction on the class of auctions, we can assume wlog that given the valuation on the first day, the prices on the two days are independent. Let the variable x d, p, v 1 denote the probability that we offer the item on day d for price p given first-day valuation v 1 . By Lemma 4, we only need to consider V d + 2 different prices on each day.
• Objective: Our expected revenue on the first day is given by:
On the second day, we must also sum over the new valuations v 2
Our objective is to maximize the total revenue:
• Feasibility constraints: In order for x d, p, v 1 to be feasible probabilities, their sum, for each d and v 1 must be one:
Similarly, they should all be non-negative:
• IC constraints: Given that the buyer's true valuation on the first day is v 1 , her utility from declaring u is given by:
The IC constraints require that
Notice that the IR constraints are implied by the fact that we only add up prices smaller than valuations. The variables x(d, p, u) for p > u don't show up anywhere in the LP.
In Appendix B we prove the following:
Theorem 6. For any number of days D, and a constant number of independent bidders k, the optimal adaptive randomized auction can be found in time polynomial in the number of types and in the number of days.
The main difficulty in writing the LP for this, much stronger, result concerns the IC constraints: naively there is an exponential number of them. Lying on day one could decrease the buyer's utility, and so does lying on day two; and yet lying on both days increases her expected utility. Therefore, when deciding to lie, the buyer must choose in advance among all exponentially many different strategies that deviate from the truth now and in the future. Notice that the number is exponential even for two days: the optimization is over functions from true pairs of types to declared pairs of types. To get around this problem, we embed a dynamic program into the IC constraints part of the LP.
Details are in Appendix B.
Polynomial deterministic cases
We have two positive results for deterministic mechanisms, also obtained through linear programming:
Theorem 7. If the prices in the first day are fixed, then the optimum deterministic mechanism can be approximated by an FPTAS.
Theorem 8. If the number of types (the support of first-day valuations) is constant, then the optimum deterministic mechanism can be computed in polynomial time.
We give here a brief sketch of the proofs. For the first result, we subdivide the range of secondday prices into a grid of accuracy 1 K (by taking K large enough we obtain an FPTAS), and consider 0 − 1 variables with meaning "the price q i is not larger than the jth grid point." It turns out that the IC constraints become totally unimodular (for more details see Appendix C.)
For the second result, we notice that once we have fixed, for each type, the interval between second-day valuations in which the second-day price for this type lies (larger than all if the item is not allocated to this type), then the IC constraints become linear inequalities. This is because the cumulative distributions are piecewise constant, and thus the integrals in the IC constraints become linear functions once we know the interval in which the bounds of each integral lie. Since there are |V 2 | |V 1 | ways to map the |V 1 | second-day prices to the |V 2 | second-day intervals, and we assume that |V 1 | is constant, we only need to solve a polynomial number of LPs.
Separations
We have so far considered deterministic and randomized auctions; we are now going to compare them in terms of the revenue generated, against each other and against two other benchmarks:
• the optimal non-adaptive auction -i.e. running an independent Myerson's auction on each day; and
• the optimal social welfare SW -the expected revenue of the buyer from receiving all the items for free.
The following is immediate:
Fact 9. For any distribution of valuations,
But are these inequalities strict for some valuation distributions? And by how much?
Theorem 10. Let v * be the maximal buyer's valuation in any day, and assume that all valuations are integral. Then in any two-day auction, the maximum, over all auctions, ratio:
• between SW and any of {Rev (non-adaptive) , Rev (deterministic) , Rev (randomized)} is exactly the harmonic number of v * ,
• between either of {Rev (deterministic) , Rev (randomized)} and Rev (non-adaptive) is at least Ω log 1/2 v * (and at most O (log v * )); and
• between Rev (randomized) and Rev (deterministic) is at least Ω log 1/3 v * ( and at most O (log v * ) ).
Furthermore, even when the valuations on the different days are independent, there exists a twoday auction with ratio of Ω (log log v * ) between either of {Rev (deterministic) , Rev (randomized)} and Rev (non-adaptive).
Warm up: Revenue vs Social Welfare
To compare non-adaptive auctions to optimal social welfare, we can assume with no loss of generality that the auction occurs in a single day.
Proposition 11. Let v * be the maximal buyer's valuation, and assume that all valuations are integral. For a single day auction, the maximum ratio between SW and Rev (non-adaptive) is at least
Proof. Suppose that the buyer has valuation 2 with probability 1/2, 4 with probability 1/4, etc. until 2 n with probability 2 −n (and 0 also with probability 2 −n ). Now, if the auctioneer hands out the item for free, the expected social welfare is SW = n i=1 2 −i · 2 i = n. For any choice of price 2 k chosen by the non-adaptive auction, the expected revenue is
The construction above is extremely useful in proving such lower bounds. In fact it is also used in our NP-hardness result. The distribution used is the well known equal-revenue distribution. We will refer to it as pow2 [1, n] to unify our notation. In general:
Definition 12. We say that v ∼ c·pow2 [a, b] if v = c·2 a+i with probability 2 −i−1 for all i ∈ [b − a], and v = 0 with probability 2 a−b−1 . Note in particular that the expectation is
We conclude this introductory subsection by proving a tight version of the above proposition, namely Lemma 13. Let v * be the maximal buyer's valuation, and assume that all valuations are integral. The maximum, over all single day auctions, ratio between SW and Rev (non-adaptive) is exactly the harmonic number of v * .
Proof.
where Rev (p = t) denotes the expected revenue from charging t. Finally, note the inequality can be made tight by setting Pr [v ≤ t] = 1 t for all 1 ≤ t ≤ v * . Note that in the single day setting, the optimal randomized auction does not achieve more revenue than Myerson's fixed price; therefore the same bound immediately holds for adaptive deterministic and randomized auctions.
Corollary 14. Let v * be the maximal buyer's valuation, and assume that all valuations are integral. The maximum, over all single day auctions, ratio between SW and Rev (deterministic), and between SW and Rev (deterministic) is exactly the harmonic number of v * .
Independent valuations
Surprisingly, adaptive auctions achieve a higher revenue even when the valuations on the different days are independent.
A well-known approach for extracting the entire social welfare under ex-ante individual rationality is the sale of "lottery-tickets", i.e. sell the item before the buyer sees her valuation. A rational, risk-neutral buyer would be willing to pay the expected social welfare. Here, ex post individual rationality excludes many such auctions. In the two-day setting this may still be possible:
• We could sell on the first day a "lottery-ticket" for the second day; we will remain ex-post IR because of the utility derived from the first-day item.
This sounds promising, but there is one more obstacle to overcome: If the value of the first day is higher than the cost of the lottery ticket, why can't we extract it by a fixed price auction on the first day?
• We will use the same construction from Lemma 11 to ensure that the welfare on the first day cannot be extracted using a fixed price mechanism.
Informally, we are hiding the ex-post vs ex-ante IR issue in the IC constraints, which we only require to be satisfied ex-interim.
Lemma 15. Let v * be the maximal buyer's valuation, and assume that all valuations are integral. For a two-day auction, the ratio between the Rev (deterministic) and Rev (non-adaptive) can be as large as
, even when the valuations on each day are independent.
Proof. Let N = 2 n . Let the valuation the first day be distributed as v 1 ∼ pow2 [1, n], and on the second day v 2 ∼ pow2 [1, N ]. As we have seen in the proof of Lemma 11, the optimal revenue for running two separate fixed-price auctions is a constant Rev (non-adaptive) < 4. We first show a randomized mechanism that extracts revenue n: The randomized adaptive mechanism will ask the buyer for her valuation v 1 on the first day. It will give her the item and charge full price. On the second day, she will receive the item for free with probability v 1 /N , and otherwise she will not receive the item at all. Notice that this is IC: her expected utility when reporting v ′ is (v 1 − v ′ ) on the first day, plus ( v ′ N )N = v ′ on the second day. So, her total expected utility from the auction is v 1 , no matter what v ′ she reported. The expected revenue is exactly the expected valuation on the first day: Rev (randomized) = n.
What about deterministic adaptive auctions? The same idea works, except that in the deterministic case, the auctioneer "punishes" the buyer for lower bids by charging higher prices on the second day.
On the first day, the deterministic adaptive mechanism will charge the buyer almost the full price v 1 − 2 − 2 −v 1 . On the second day, we will offer the item for price p 2 v 1 = 2 N −v 1 . The buyer's expected utility from the second day is now exactly
Once again, the buyer's expected utility on the second day exactly covers the price on the first day, which guarantees that this auction satisfies IC.
Finally, note the expected revenue is almost as large as the expected valuation on the first day Rev (deterministic) > n − 2.
Stronger adaptivity gaps for correlated valuations
When the valuations are correlated, we can show stronger adaptivity gaps.
Lemma 16. Let v * be the maximal buyer's valuation, and assume that all valuations are integral. For a two-day auction, the ratio between the Rev (deterministic) and Rev (non-adaptive) can be as large as
Proof. Again, let the first-day valuation be distributed v 1 ∼ pow2 [1, n] . The second-day valuation v 2 will be conditioned on the first day:
We already saw that the non-adaptive policy's revenue on the first day is less than 2. What is the optimal price for the second day? To answer this question we must consider the marginal distribution of the second day:
Therefore, Pr v 2 ≥ 2 l /n ≤ n · 2 1−l , which implies Rev (non-adaptive) < 4. Now, consider the randomized mechanism that on the first day charges the buyer v 1 = 2 k (and allocates the item), and on the second day allocates the item for free with probability k/n. When the buyer's true valuation on the first day is 2 k , her the expected utility from reporting 2 l is given by
which is maximized by l ∈ {k, k + 1}. The expected revenue from this randomized auction is again n.
Similarly, a deterministic auction can charge v 1 = 2 k on the first day, and offer the item on the second day for price p 2 2 k = 2 n 2 −nk /n
The second line follows because there are nl − k i's for which i : 2 k+i /n ≥ p 2 2 l . Notice that
Deterministic vs randomized auctions
Naturally, one would expect that deterministic and randomized auctions yield different revenues because we can optimize the latter in polynomial time, while optimizing over deterministic auctions is NP-hard. In this subsection we show that randomized auctions can in fact yield much more revenue.
Lemma 17. Let v * be the maximal buyer's valuation, and assume that all valuations are integral. For a two-day auction, the ratio between the Rev (randomized) and Rev (deterministic) can be as large as
Our proof builds on the constructions in the proof of Lemma 16. A key observation is that by modifying the parameters for the second day distribution, we can shift the prices without changing the expected utility. Choosing those parameters based on the valuation in the first day, will allow us to break the deterministic auctioneer's strategy, without changing the revenue of the randomized auction.
Proof. Let v 1 ∼ pow2 [1, n] . For type i with value 2 i on the first day, the valuation on the second day will be 0 with probability 1 − 2 −2n 2 i . The remaining 2 −2n 2 i will be distributed according to
i \ {0} be the set of nonzero feasible valuations on the second day, conditioned on valuation 2 i on the first day. Notice that for any i < j, all the values in V 2 i \ {0} are much smaller than all the values in V 2 j \ {0}.
The randomized mechanism, again charges full price v 1 = 2 k on the first day, and gives the item for free on the second day, with probability k/n. The buyer's utility from reporting 2 l is:
What about the deterministic auctioneer? Given any deterministic mechanism, let k * be the minimal k for which a buyer with first-day valuation 2 k has a nonzero probability of affording both items. In other words, after declaring valuation 2 k * for the first day, her second-day price is at
. Assume that the buyer has valuation v 1 = 2 l > 2 k * . If she deviates and declare type 2 k * , she receives the first item, and she also receives the second time whenever she has nonzero valuation. On the second day, she pays less than 2 2n 2 (k * +1/2) with probability 2 −2n 2 l ≤ 2 −2n 2 (k * +1) . Therefore her expected pay on the second day has a negligible expected cost (less than 2 −n 2 ). On the first day, her price cannot be greater than 2 k * . The total expected payment made by the buyer with v 1 = 2 l > 2 k * is bounded by 2 k * +2 −n 2 . Summing over the probabilities of having first-day valuation v 1 = 2 l > 2 k * , this is still less than 1.
Consider all the types whose first-day valuations are lower than 2 k * , and yet they receive the first item. Since they can never afford the second item, on the first day they must all be charged the same price, thus yielding a total revenue less than 2. Similarly, the types for which the firstday item is not allocated, must all be charged the same price on the second day. Finally, by IR constraints the expected revenue from v 1 = 2 k * is at most 2. Therefore, the total expected revenue is less than 7.
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A.1 Completeness
In this subsection we show that any independent set S in G corresponds to a feasible pricing in our auction: (B i , C i ) for i ∈ S, (A j , D j ) for j / ∈ S, and (P * , Q * ) for type t * .
Lemma 18. Let S be an independent set of G. There exists a pricing for our auction that satisfies IC and IR and achieves revenue:
We first show that the IC constraints are satisfied between any pair of types t i and t j that are not both charged (B i , C i ) -edge or no edge in the graph (Claim 19). Then, we show that the IC constraints are satisfied between type t * and type t i , for any i ∈ [n] (Claim 20). Finally we prove that charging (B i , C i ) and (B j , C j ) does not violate the IC constraints if there is no (i, j) edge in the graph (Claim 21).
Claim 19. Charging types t i and t j , for j > i, any of the pairs
, doesn't violate the IC constraints between t i and t j .
Proof. We need to show that all the following are always true:
It follows from Table 3 that the left hand sides hold. For the right hand sides, first notice that F j is always lower than F i in the intervals we're interested in. The first inequality is tight for F i , thus
we will use induction:
• Basis j = i + 1:
And:
• For j we have the following:
Claim 20. When type t * is charged (P * , Q * ), charging t i the pair (B i , C i ) or the pair (A i , D i ) doesn't violate the IC constraints between t i and t * .
Proof. The IC constraints between t i and t * are either
In both cases, the inequalities can be verified easily using Table 3 .
Claim 21. If (i, j) ∈ E the charging type t i the pair (B i , C i ) and type t j the pair (B j , C j ) doesn't violate the IC constraints between t i and t j .
Proof. The IC constraint between t i and t j for this pricing is:
• j = i + 1:
The first term is equal to ǫ γ , and when there is no (i, i + 1) edge, the second term is equal to 1 − ǫ γ , thus the left hand side is immediate. The right hand side is satisfied trivially, since F i+1 is always below F i between C i and C i+1 and F i gives a tight constraint.
• j > i + 1: Again, Table 3 we can see that the first term is always j − 1 − i + ǫ, and the second term is 1 − ǫ when (i, j) ∈ E.
For the right hand side we have
between C i and D i , and
A.2 Soundness
Lemma 22. Let S be a maximum independent set in G. Then any IC and IR auction has expected revenue at most
Proof outline
We first show that charging the pair (P * , Q * ) maximizes the revenue that can be obtained from type t * (Claim 23), and that (B i , C i ) yields the optimal revenue from type t i (Claim 24). Observe that even if we could charge the optimal prices from every type, our expected revenue would be (1 − p)Rev(t * , P * , Q * ) + p w i Rev(t i , B i , C i ), which improves over (2) by less than prn = ǫ/16. Intuitively, this means that any deviation that results in a loss of prn in terms of revenue, cannot compete with (2) . Next, we show (Claim 25) that if (i, j) ∈ E, then we cannot charge both t i and t j the optimal prices (B i , C i ) and (B j , C j ). In fact, we need a robust version of this statement: Specifically, for some small parameters ζ 1 , ζ 2 i (to be defined later), we show that we cannot charge both t i and t j prices in
respectively. What can we charge type t i instead? In Claim 26 we show that charging less than C i would require us to either not sell the item on the first day, or charge type t * less than the optimal price. On the former case, we would lose pw i · B i > ǫ/16 revenue, and would immediately imply smaller revenue than (2) . On the latter case, we can use the robustness of Claim 25; namely, we use the fact that we cannot charge i prices that are ζ 1 , ζ 2 i -close to (B i , C i ). This will imply that we must change the prices for type t * by some ζ 1 * on the first day or ζ 2 * on the second day. In either case the lost revenue is again greater than what we could potentially gain over (2) . Therefore, we must charge t i more than C i on the second day. Claim 27 shows that charging D i is the best option in this case.
Therefore an upper bound to the revenue we can make is the following: charge (B i , C i ) for all i belonging to some independent set S ′ , and (B j , D j ) for all other j / ∈ S ′ . (It is easy to see than in our construction even these prices won't satisfy the IC constraints). Now, the revenue given by these prices is:
Therefore, the total expected revenue
which is at most the expression in (2)
Preliminaries
We begin by setting our padding parameters: let ζ 1 = ǫ 4 , and for each i let ζ 2 i = ǫ 4γ 2 h i . In particular, this implies that for every i, ζ 2
, and ζ 2 * = ǫ 8h * . We now have that ζ 2 i h i γ 2 = ζ 1 = ζ 2 * h * + ζ 1 * , which we will use later in the proof. Most importantly, recall that losing ǫ 8 from the revenue from type t * , is equivalent to a loss of (1 − p)
16 from the total expected revenue, which immediately implies that the expected revenue is less than (2).
Optimality of (P * , Q * )
We will now prove that prices (P * , Q * ) maximize the revenue from type t * , in a robust sense:
Claim 23. Charging type t * prices (P * , Q * ) maximizes the revenue from that type. Furthermore, if p * < P * − ζ 1 * or q * < Q * − ζ 2 * , then the revenue from type t * is lower than the maximal revenue by at least ζ 1 * or ζ 2 * h * , respectively.
Proof. Clearly, P * is the most that we can charge type t * on the first day. It is left to show that Q * maximizes the revenue on the second day.
On the second day, we have:
Recall that F * changes on C i 's and D i 's, so those are the only candidates we should compare with Q * . For any C i , we have
Similarly, we show that (B i , C i ) maximize the revenue from type t i .
Proof. Since F i is constant for all x ≤ C i , the claim for this domain follows trivially. We will prove that Rev 2 (t i , C i ) > Rev 2 (t i , D i ) and deduce from Claim 27 that the claim continues to holds for any other x.
Condition on edges
Below we show that if there is an edge (i, j), then we cannot charge both t i and t j close to their optimal prices:
Proof. Wlog, let i < j. Assume by contradiction that the conclusion is false. Then we get q j q i F i < p i − p j , which is a contradiction to IC constraints for type i:
where the third line follows by
Restriction imposed by charging (P * , Q * ) for type *
The claim below essentially shows that we cannot go around the restriction on prices for neighbors by reducing the prices:
Claim 26. If p * > P * − ζ 1 * and q * > Q * − ζ 2 * , then in any IC solution either: • p i > B i -note that this means that type i cannot purchase the item on the first day; or • q i > C i -note that this substantially decreases our revenue for type i on the second day; or
Proof. The negation of the claim gives us two configurations: having p i ≤ B i and q i < C i − ζ 2 i , and having p i < B i − ζ 1 and q i ≤ C i . We will show the claim is true by contradiction, i.e. both these configurations are violating.
Assume first that p i ≤ B i and q i < C i − ζ 2 i . Consider the IC constraint comparing t * 's utility when telling the truth and when claiming that she is type t i :
where the third line follows from ζ 2
We now return to the other violating configuration, namely p i < B i − ζ 1 and q i ≤ C i . We now have
We now show that D i is the optimal price on the second day for type t i , conditioned on charging more than C i .
Proof. It is easy to see that the second day revenue is maximal for one of the "special points" where F i changes. At D i we have:
• Finally, for points x > D n+1 , we will show that Rev 2 (t n , D n+1 ) is greater than Rev 2 (t n , x), and the claim will follow for all i ≤ n by the previous argument. (Recall that in the domain x > D n+1 , F i is the same for all i.)
F n changes its values at points 2 k D n+1 . We have:
A.3 Putting it all together
In Lemma 18 we saw that if there exists an independent set of size |S| there exists an IC and IR satisfying pricing which yields revenue where |S| is the size of the maximum independent set in |S|. All that's left is to show that a graph with maximum independent set of size |S| − 1 cannot yield revenue (1 − p)Rev(t * , P * , Q * ) + p i∈V w i Rev(t i , A i , D i ) + pr|S|, or in other words (1−p)Rev(t * , P * , Q * )+p 
B Multiple days, multiple bidders
In this section we will write an LP that will find a revenue-optimal randomized auction for k independent bidders in a D-days setting. What is the most general structure of a truthful randomized auction? On the first day, we ask the bidders for their valuations v 1
[k] = v 1 1 , . . . , v 1 k ∈ R k + , and give a distribution over the allocation x 1 ∈ [k] ∪ {⊥}, and price p 1 ∈ 0, v 1 x 1 . On the second day, we again ask the bidders for their valuations v 2
[k] -here we defer from the semi-adaptive framework we introduced in the previous section. Given the history v [2] [k] = v 1 1 , . . . , v 1 k , v 2 1 , . . . , v 2 k of the buyer's responses -and the allocation and price x 1 , p 1 on the first day-we give a probability distribution for the current allocation and price x 2 , p 2 . Notice that the dependence on x 1 , p 1 means that the allocations and prices on different days may not be independent -even conditioned on the bidders' valuations.
Definition 28. An adaptive auction takes as input on each day the history of bidders' valuations (including the current), and the history of allocations and prices, and outputs a distribution over allocations and prices for the current day.
The main challenge with optimizing over adaptive auctions is the structure of the IC constraints. In particular, we must handle the following complication: it is possible that lying on day 1 decreases a bidder's utility, and so does lying on day 2; yet lying on both days increases her expected utility! Therefore, when deciding to lie, the bidder must choose in advance among all exponentially many different strategies that deviate from the truth now and in the future. Nevertheless, we can write a polynomial size LP using dynamic programming.
As was the case for semi-adaptive auctions, we do not lose generality by restricting to prices that are exactly feasible valuations: Proof. Essentially the same as the proof of Lemma 4.
Finally, we are ready to describe our LP a randomized adaptive auction for k > 1 bidders and D > 2 days.
Note that typically, the number of types grows exponentially with D.
Proof. We define an LP that optimizes over all feasible joint distributions of allocations and prices. The most interesting part is the dynamic programming definition of the IC constraints.
• Probability Variables: We introduce variables that specify the joint distribution of prices and allocations. Let v . (Of course, we will only maintain variables that corresponds to feasible and IR allocations and prices.)
• Objective: Our expected revenue from allocating all the items up to time D to bidders This result shows us something very important about the structure of any possible reduction: the auction gadgets cannot have fixed prices for one of the two days; variation on both days is required.
